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Introduction 
The proposal of an import surcharge has been put forward 
in several papers published in the P.D.R. The proposal is not 
a new one but it has recently generated a renewed interest on 
the part of economists and government officials. The purpose of 
this paper is to compare (under some restrictive assumptions) 
the surcharge cum bonus policy with the more orthodox one of de-
valuation. The paper attempts to determine the extent to which 
these tw^ alternatives differ. Criteria for choosing between the 
two alternatives are defined and the advantages of devaluation 
are enumerated. 
The Problem 
All countries which have fixed or quasi-fixed exchange 
rates find themselves at one time or another in a position where 
at the prevailing exchange rate, the balance of payments is in 
disequilibrium, i.e. where the demand for foreign exchange either 
to import goods and services or to export capital, is greater 
than the supply which is obtained from the export of goods and 
services or from the import of foreign capital. 
The stock responses to balance of payments disequilibrium 
are devaluation or domestic deflation. In developing economies 
where the pressure on the balance of payments is often due to the 
* Dr. Soligo is Assistant Professor of Economics, Yale University. 
He was Research Adviser to the Pakistan Institute of Development 
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implementation of an -active develoafnaajt: .ideogram in-the face of 
stagnating exports, the solution lias in devaluation. 
Devaluation, howeverx is not always appropriate for these 
countries particularly when the foreign demand for their exports 
is inelastic. In these cases, devaluation would have the desired 
effect of reducing imports but would also have the undesired dffect 
of reducing foreign exchange earnings (since the price of exports 
in foreign currency would decline). In cases where both the do-
mestic demand for imports and the foreign demand for exports is 
inelastic, devaluation would lead to an even further deteriora-
tion in the balance of payments position. 
Multiple exchange rates are one way for these countries to 
restore balance of payments equilibrium without the cost of re-
ducing their overall earnings of foreign exchange. The purpose of 
multiple exchange rates is to create a gap between the price which 
importers must pay for foreign exchange and the price which ex-
porters receive for these earnings. By increasing- the former the 
demand for imports is reduced; by holding the latter constant 
the same volume of exports will earn the same amount of foreign 
exchange. More subtle distinctions can be made; if only a portion 
of a country's exports face an inelastic demand curve then there 
can be two rates for exports—a higher price being paid for those 
exports which have an elastic demand. 
Since multiple exchange rates are not considered respectable 
(and are frowned upon by the I.M.F.) they must be introduced under 
various guises such as foreign exchange auctions, import licensing, 
and import surcharges to limit the inflow of imports; export bo-
nuses to increase exports of commodities facing an elastic demand 
and export taxes to restrict exports of those commodities which 
face an inelastic demand. Through these devices, a courtry can 
achieve the results of multiple exchange rates while at the same 
time maintain only one official e*cha«ge-
<£he Pakistan Case 
Since the end af the Korean boom Pakistan4-? balance of pay*-
ments has been in chronic disequilibrium in the sense that at 
the official rate of exchange the demand for foreign exchange 
has exceeded the supply. Jn November 1952 import licensing was 
introduced to allocate the supply of foreign exchange. There have 
been considerable changes in licensing since then but the basic 
feature of foreign exchange allocation through licensing still 
y remains, 
Both prices and the volume of Pakistan's exports continued 
to decline after 1952 until in 1954-55 the value of exports was 
less than one half of the 1950-51 value (when earnings were at 
their peak). In vluly 1955 the Pakistani Rupee was devalued to the 
current price of Rs. 4.765 per U.S, dollar. In January 1959 the 
Government instituted the export bonus scheme as a further partial 
2/ 
devaluation of the Rupee. Almost all commodities are on the ex-
port bonus scheme. The important exceptions are raw cotton and 
jute. 
Since Partition Pakistan has levied export duties on some 
of its exports. These have gradually been eliminated until cur-
rently they are levied only on raw jute, cotton, fish and poultry 
3/ 
and eggs. Export taxes have primarily been a revenue measure 
although they have bee^ justified as a means of preventing the 
further decline in the price (expressed in foreign exchange) of" 
Pakistan's primary expo~'-s, 
1/ For a description of the licensing system see 4 
2/ For a des<3*iption and analysis of the export scheme see 
L 1 J 
3/ For a discussion of their importance in total government 
revenue see J • 3 J 
Pakistan has fflQuec1 a jie facto multiple exchange sys-
tem by means of import licensing, import tariffs, export bonus 
and exp03?t t-ax^ s.^  The particular collection of policies chosen 
have had some disadvantages particularly the method of allocating 
foreign exchange* Since at the present exchange rate there is an 
excess demand for foreign exchange the government allocates the 
available supply to industrial users of imported raw materials and 
capital goods and to commercial importers who resell to households 
and industry. Implicit in getting a license is a substantial wind-
fall profit since imported goods can be sold at very large mark-
1/ 
ups over their c.i.f. values. Besides giving large "license 
created profits" to impoi^ ters, the system encourages the use of im-
ported raw materials and capital goods since to the industrial 
importers at least, these are valued at the official exchange rate 
rather than their true scarcity price. 
In order to transfer the""license created profits" to the 
national treasury and improve the allocation of scarce imports by 
making their price reflect their true opportunity costs economists 
have advocated that an import surcharge be added to the existing 
system. 
Background of the Surcharge Proposal 
The idea of an import surcharge for Pakistan was first put 
into print, as far as I know, by Professor Emile Despres in an in-
ternal memorandum of the Planning Commission in December 1956. 
2 J The proposal was made at a time when exports of raw 
cotton and jute accounted for 72% of total exports and manufactured 
goods accounted for roughly 15 % of the total. Further, the pro-
posal came less than 18 months after the rupee was devalued. 
The proposal of an import surcharge made against the circum-
1/ For a discussion and estimate of these margins see £ 5.JJ 
stances of 195S made obvious sense. A further devaluation would 
not increase foreign exchange earnings; hence the way to wipe out 
the excess demand for foreign exchange and to improve the effi-
ciency of its allocation, was to increase its price to importers. 
A foreign exchange auction was ruled out on the grounds that the 
I.M.F. would disapprove. The import surcharge was proposed as an 
alternative which would be acceptable to the I.M.F. and would ac-
complish the same objective. 
Today there is a feasible alternative to the surcharge propo-
sal. Pakistan already has a ae facto partial devaluation implicit 
in the export bonus scheme. The alternative is to make this deva-
luation "official" and thereby simultaneously eliminating the ex-
cess demand for imports and accomplishing the results of the export 
bonus scheme without the bonus mechanism. By adding an import -
surcharge to the bonus scheme, Pakistan would be simulating the 
effect of devaluation. 
In what follows, it is shown that whether the devaluation is 
"'official" or simulated, the results will be very much the same. 
The choice between the two alternatives must primarily be made 
on "non-economic" grounds. 
A Comparison of devaluation and surcharge cum bonus 
The primary assumption made throughout the paper is that the 
purpose of a surcharge or devaluation is to eliminate the excess 
demand for imports by appropriating for the government the surplus, 
arising out of this excess demand which has in the past accrued to 
importers. The purpose is not to reduce actual imports and increase 
exports but merely to change internal prices so that at the existing 
levels of imports and exports, the demand for and supply of foreign 
exchange will be equal. 
Changes in exports and hence imports may result from the sur-
charge or devalustiw i^ fc -we f^eat *iv© g3v«n»ont «±12 take 
other appropriate measures to minimize these secondary effects. 
In other •word;*, we -ara -discAiis-siiig the optimum amount of 
surcharge and bonus or devaluation - if in fact there is a unique 
optimum. Nor are we discussing which method would be best to in-
crease exports and foreign exchange earnings above the existing 
levels. Although no less interesting than the problem discussed in 
this paper, these other questions are separable issues and not 
within the scope of this paper. 
The demand side 
Given the assumption enumerated above, the degree of deva-
luation which would be necessary to eliminate the excess demand for 
imports given the existing supply of foreign exchange would be 
equal to the rate of surcharge required to accomplish the same end. 
For example, if a 50% surcharge is the highest rate which would 
equate the demand for imports to the existing supply, then a 50% 
devaluation would be required to have exactly the same effect. 
The difference between the two systems is simply the way in which 
the price of imports is increased. Under the surcharge, the im-
porter buys his foreign exchange at the current official rate but 
pays an additional 50% tariff on his imports. With devaluation the 
importer simply pays.an additional 50% for his foreign exchange 
and does not pay any additional import taxes. 
2. The Supply Side 
Both the imposition of a surcharge or devaluation will affect 
the level of exports, earnings of foreign exchange and their im-
ports . 
A uniform surcharge on all imports will ceterus paribus, 
shift the demand for bonus vouchers (and bonus imports) to the 
left which in turn will lead to a reduction in the bonus voucher 
premium ana hence, in incentives to export,,. Exports of bonus 
items will be reduced; so will imports in subsequent periods. 
The effect of devaluation on foreign exchange earnings is 
less clear. For non-bonus commodities facing an inelastic demand 
the relative decline in the foreign price will exceed the relative 
increase in quantity exported and hence exchange earnings are re-
duced. For non-bonus commodities facing an elastic foreign demand, 
the opposite is true. Changes :• > foreign exchange earnings from 
bonus exports will depend on the degree of devaluation relative 
to the present bonus earnings in addition to foreign demand elas-
ticities . 
We have already assumed that the purpose of the surcharge or 
devaluation is to eliminate excess demand for imports at the 
current level of imports. To do so, the government will have to 
adopt additional measures along with the surcharge or devaluation 
to protect foreign exchange earnings. There are many measures 
which can be taken. To simplify the discussion we have considered 
only the obvious ones which use existing policies and taxes, The 
conclusions, however, are not limited to these measures. 
Surcharge cum Bonus 
As explained above, the imposition of a surcharge will lead 
to a reduction in exports. This adverse effect could be prevented 
by exempting imports on bonus vouchers from the surcharge (or 
subject thepr to a different rate of surcharge) or by direct go-
vernment" intervention either to maintain the premium on bonus 
voi*ch<2rs or to directly subsidize exporters of bonus items. 
The extent to which the premium would be affected and hence 
the extent to which the government would have to subsidize exports 
by supporting the bonus voucher price will depend, among other 
things, on the substitutabili'y of foreign exchange purchased 
directly from the State Bank and that purchased via bonus vouchers. 
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If all commodities could be imported fejth -with or without bonus 
vouchers then premium, on bonus vouchers- must, fall, to zero— 
for tit>. one woul<J pajt arqr -additional amount for foreign exchange 
y 
than the official rate. The .government would. then have to pay 
exporters the total amount which they now earn from the bonus 
voucher premium. At current premium rates the government subsidy 
wouldb;-be about 40% of the f.o.b. value of all bonus exports. 
The current import policy is such that no commodity can be 
imported by both licence and bonus voucher; hence foreign exchange 
purchased directly from the State ^ nk is substitutable for that 
available via bonus voucher only to the extent that commodities 
imported under the two kinds of foreign exchange are substitutable. 
Even in the unlikely case of zero substitutability among these two 
categories of imports the demand /or bonus voucher imports may 
still fall because of substitution with domestically produced 
goods and because of income effects. In any case, with some con-
straint as to which commodities can be imported with or without 
bonus vouchers, direct government subsidies to exporters would be .-
less than the case where there were no constraints. The constraints, 
in effect, are additional taxes on the users of bonus voucher im-
ports. These taxes are transferred directly to exporters. 
The supporting measures for the import surcharge are either 
i) what amounts to an elimination of the market in bonus vouchers, 
where the government (State Bank) simply buys foreign exchange 
earned on bonus exports at a higher rate (or rates if the present 
policy of differential bonus rates continues) than that earned from 
non bonus exports, or (ii) a combination of differential sur-
charge rates, limitations on what commodities can be imported with-
out bonus vouchers and direct government intervention in the bonus 
voucher market. 
1/ We are already assuming throughout' that the import surcharge is 
sufficiently high to wipe out all excess demand for imports at 
the official exchange rate. 
premium and hence, in incentives to export,,. Exports of bonus 
items will be reduced; so will imports in subsequent periods, 
The effect of devaluation on foreign exchange earnings is 
less clear. For non-bonus commodities facing an inelastic demand 
the relative decline in the foreign price will exceed the relative 
increase in quantity exported and hence exchange earnings are re-
duced. For non-bonus commodities facing an elastic foreign demand, 
the opposite is true. Changes ii foreign exchange earnings from 
bonus exports will depend on the degree of devaluation relative 
to the present bonus earnings in addition to foreign demand elas-
ticities . 
We have already assumed that the purpose of the surcharge or 
devaluation is to eliminate excess demand for imports at the 
current level of imports. To do so, the government will have to 
adopt additional measures along with the surcharge or devaluation 
to protect foreign exchange earnings. There are many measures 
which can be taken. To simplify the discussion we have considered 
only the obvious ones which use existing policies and taxes. The 
conclusions, however, are not limited to these measures. 
Surcharge cum Bonus 
As explained above, the imposition of a surcharge will lead 
to a reduction in exports. This adverse effect could be prevented 
by exempting imports on bonus vouchers from the surcharge (or 
subject then* to a different rate of surcharge) or by direct go-
vernment intervention either to maintain the premium on bonus 
vouchers or to directly subsidize exporters of bonus items. 
The extent to which the premium would be affected and hence 
the extent to which the government would have to subsidize exports 
by supporting the bonus voucher price will depend, among other 
things, on the substitutabili'y of foreign exchange purchased 
directly from the State Bank and that purchased via bonus vouchers. 
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Devaluation 
The effect of devaluation on total foreign exchange"earnings 
depends on the foreign demand elasticities for Pakistan's ex-
ports and on the rate of devaluation relative to the rate implied 
by the existing bonus voucher system. 
Exports facing an inelastic demand curve are the non-bonus 
items, raw jute, and more doubtfully, raw cotton. Bonus exports 
y in general face an elastic demand. 
Foreign exchange earnings from the inelastic non-bonus com-
modities would decline after a devaluation of the rupee. The 
foreign exchange loss can be prevented by increasing the level of 
the export tax on these commodities. Since we are assuming that 
* 
the purpose of devaluation is to restore equilibrium from the de-
mand side and should have as little impact as possible On the 
supply side, the increase in export taxes should be equal to the 
amount by which devaluation lowers the export price when expressed 
in foreign exchange. In this way, the export tax removes the 
price reduction implicit in devaluation. Since the foreign price 
is unaffected, exports and hence export earnings from these com-
modities unaffected. 
Earnings from commodities currently exported on .bonus will 
rise or fall depending upon whether the official devaluations were 
greater or less than the devaluation implicit in the existing 
bonus rates and premium. 
Available evidence suggests that the official devaluation 
would be greater than the current de facto devaluation. The pre-
sent export bonus scheme at current premiunegive exporters a rupee 
return of between 140 and 150 per cent of the f.o.b. price valued 
1/ For a discussion of the response of exports to the bonus scheme 
see J_ 1 J 
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at the present official exchange rate. Data on domestic prices of 
imports [_ 5 J suggest that the devaluation required ,to eliminate 
excess demand would be much greater than 50%. 
Taking these results to be correct, the post devaluation 
foreign exchange earnings on all commodities facing an elastic 
demand will be greater than existing earnings under the bonus scheme. 
Supporting measures for devaluation will include higher ex-
port taxes on the few commodities facing an inelastic demand. No 
additional measures would be required if the impact of devaluation 
on the exports of bonus items is accepted. If, however, the cur-
rent composition and value must be preserved then, under the more 
plausible assumption about the magnitude of devaluation, the go-
vernment would have to levy additional export taxes on commodities 
currently on bonus. Since there are currently differential rates 
of bonus, there would correspondingly have to be-differential 
rates of export tax to preserve price relatives and hence compo-
sition. 
Ease and Cost of Administration of the two Alternatives 
From the discussion above it is clear that the administratitive 
advantages of devaluation over the surcharge cum bonus system de-
pend upon the number of additional constraints on the value and 
composition of exports which must be met. The advantage or dis-
advantage of devaluation is that it simultaneously determines, 
and in fact equates, the effective buying and selling price of 
foreign exchange. To the extent that the government wishes to 
maintain a number of buying, and selling prices, devaluation has 
no advantage in terms of administrative convenience and cost over 
surcharge and export bonus schemes. 
If the government would consider a system of surcharge cum 
bonus where there is only one rate of bonus and where the bonus 
- 11 
rate plus premium is equal to the rate of surcharge, then deva-
luation is definately a superior way of achieving the same end. 
First it's easier to collect increased export taxes on the one or 
two commodities which face an inelastic demand than it is to col-
lect higter import taxes on the full range of imports. Given the 
existence of tariff differentials, importers will try ti> circum-
vent the higher rates by exploiting various loopholes such as am-
biguities in commodity definitions. With a surcharge added to the 
axready high rates of duty, the incentives to find means of re-
ducing import tax levies will increase. 
Second, devaluation eliminates the need for the export bo-
nus scheme and all the resources which are required to administer 
it. 
Revenue Implications 
The import surcharge is often advocated on the grounds that 
it is a means of increasing government revenues. As noted below, 
government revenues will increase in both the devaluation and sur-
charge cum bonus systems. Either alternative can raise more than 
the other by driving a larger wedge between the effective price 
the government pays for foreign exchange and the effective price 
for which it sells it. The extra revenue, however, comes at the 
cost of reduced exports and less efficient resource allocation. 
Since the allocation inefficiencies of the present system are 
often quoted in support of a surcharge, it is difficult to see how 
advocates of the surcharge can also argue in its favour, as 
opposed to devaluation, on the basis of increasing tax revenue. 
If the surcharge is to be levied in such a way that it does not 
have adverse effects on resource allocation then the revenue de-
rived from the surcharge will be the same as the revenue derived 
under devaluation. 
In considering tax revenue from the surcharge on imports we 
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first consider those imports which are financed by foreign assist-
ance. Government revenue from this source is the same in both 
cases. Foreign aid can be viewed as transfers of foreign ex-
change from foreign governments and international agencies to the 
Pakistan government which in turn sells this foreign exchange to 
importers. The government will get all of the rupee proceeds from 
the sale of this foreign exchange whether they sell it at the 
current official rate then collect a surcharge or whether they sell 
y it at the new (post devaluation) rate and collect no surcharge. 
Now consider those imports financed out of export earnings of 
non-bonus items. Under the surcharge cum bonus system, government 
revenues are the import surcharge plus current export duties. 
Under devaluation revenue is from export taxes only. The increase 
2/ 
m export taxes is equal to the rate of surcharge. Hence, tax 
collections are the same under both alternatives. 
Finally, consider those imports financed out of the export 
bonus items. With devaluation, government revenue from these im-
ports is zero. Under the surcharge cum bonus system government re-
venue arises out of the difference in the rata of surcharge on 
imports and the rate of bonus paid to exporters. If these two 
rates are the same, the surcharge cum bonus system is identical 
with devaluation. 
If the rate of surcharge exceeds the bonus paid to exporters 
of bonus items the government will have larger revenues under the 
surcharge, cum bonus scheme than it would by devaluation. 
1/ Actually, as pointed out later, revenue from the surcharge 
will be less than after devaluation to the extent that foreign 
exchange is not used to import commodities. 
2/ In order to maintain the volume of exports and the earnings 
from them, it would be necessary to equate the increase in 
export taxes to the rate of devaluation which in turn, is 
equal to the rate of surcharge. 
_ j_o 
The difference in governmental revenue under the two schemes 
is equal to the product of the difference between the surcharge 
and bonus premium and the f.o.b. value of bonus exports. With 
the currently prevailing composition of exports the base on 
which this extra revenue is collected is relatively small. Even 
for relatively large differences between the surcharge and bonus 
premium, the extra revenue collected under the surcharge cum 
bonus system is not going to be very large. 
Increasing revenue in this manner has two adverse effects 
which must be weighed against the benefits of the extra revenue. 
First, if there is a gap between the surcharge rate and the export 
bonus rate then exports will be less than they would be if the 
gap were zero or, what is the same thing, less than they would be 
under devaluation. In effect, the gap is a tax on bonus exports 
and an indirect subsidy to domestic consumption. 
Second, all tariffs on imported raw materials and capital 
goods which are not offset by an export bonus of the same magni-
tude drive a wedge between the price that domestic manufacturers 
pay for imported inputs and the price they receive when they re-
export those inputs embodied in domestic manufactures. In other 
words, a gap between tariffs and export bonus is a tax on export 
industries using imported inputs. 
A case can be made that it is precisely this kind of ex-
port industry in which Pakistan has a comparative advantage. 
Pakistan has a comparative abundance of cheap labour but is rela-
tively poor in other resources. The potential for an export in-* 
dustry then lies in importing raw materials adding cheap labour 
and exporting the finished product. A more specific proposal of 
this type has been made by Norman Van Scherpenberg J_ 6 _/. 
He has argued that one relatively easy and obvious way to develop 
an export industry is for Pakistan to produce relatively labour 
intensive components of commodities which are currently, wholly 
produced elsewhere. A gap between total tariff charges and the 
bonus rate would tax this kind of specialization and hinder its 
development. 
These adverse effects are already a feature of the existing 
system. The argument here is that these distortions can and 
should be reduced at least to the extent of equating the rate of 
bonus premium to the rate of import surcharge. The surcharge cum 
bonus system will yield higher government revenues than those 
available through devaluation only by having a higher degree of 
distortion than under devaluation. 
Arguments against devaluation 
Besides the revenue aspects discussed above there are se-
veral standard arguments against devaluation: 
1) the demand for Pakistan's exports are 
inelastic, 
2) the I.M.F. is against it, 
3) it will make India happy. 
We have already discussed the first objection. At most only 
a few commodities face an inelastic demand. The prices of these 
can be protected by increasing the export tax on them. As for the 
second argument I think that I.M.F. resistance to devaluation is 
exaggerated. In any case, the I.M.F. surely are more opposed to 
surcharges and multiple exchange rates for bonus and non-bonus items 
than they are to devaluation. The third argument is said to be 
the most important. From the economic point of view it is irra-
tional. To the extent that Pakistan and India compete in foreign 
markets, devaluation by Pakistan will lead to Pakistani gain in 
trade at the expense of India. Besides, there is good reason to 
think that India wou."H follow Pakistan in any devaluation. It is 
always difficult to assess the political and psychological effects 
of devaluation but these can be exaggerated. 
Arguments for devaluation 
We have already pointed out the case where devaluation has 
administrative advantages over a system of import surcharge and 
export bonus. 
Other arguments for devaluation involve 
1. magnitude of foreign exchange loss through 
the black market, 
2. coverage of devaluation, 
3. the "mirage" effect. 
Devaluation is preferred to a surcharge in its effect on 
the black market for foreign exchange because an increase in the 
official price of foreign exchange will shift the black market 
supply curve upward and to the left. Ceterus paribus the black 
market price will rise and the quantity exchanged illegally will 
be reduced. An import surcharge would continue the current low 
rupee price of foreign exchange and hence the current rate of 
foreign exchange loss. 
The second point concerns the non universality of the import 
surcharge. Tariffs are levied on imports of goods. Thus, foreign 
exchange which is used for other purposes such as trips abroad, 
education abroad—and in fact all of the items included under 
"invisibles" in the balance of payments account are purchased at 
the official rate of exchange without any surcharge. There is no 
reason why the purchasers of these services should not also pay the 
true opportunity cost of foreign exchange. Of course, one can 
always devise a special tax to cover these items too. 
The third argument is referred to as the "mirage" effect be-
cause the official exchange rate is not the "real" exchange rate. 
Perhaps the economists will not be fooled but most people are not 
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as sophisticated in the fine tricks of the profession. The public 
will continue to think that the real exchange rate is Rs. 4.7S5 
to the dollar (affr?r all it is for some purposes). When the sur-
charge is levied the public will raise their voices in indig-
nation at the prohibitive tariffs, which will be obvious to see, 
in much the same way as they decry the profits accruing to current 
license holders. Since individual tariffs can be changed many 
cases for special consideration will be made on the basis of need, 
encouragement to domestic industry and other worthy causes. The 
government may not give way to this public pressure but it will un 
doubtedly have to expend a great deal of energy and time trying to 
convince the public that the surcharge is the same as devaluation 
even though it does not include invisibles and capital account 
transactions. 
To get some idea of the misunderstanding which is generated 
when a country tries to simulate devaluation one need only recall 
the reaction to the recent British surcharge and export promotion 
scheme. Very few countries see this as a temporary devaluation and 
many countries, including Pakistan, are seeking exemption from 
it. 
Devaluation on the other hand is viewed as irrevocable and 
no one would think of asking to be exempted from it. 
The Issue 
We have shown that a surcharge cum bonus system can be de-
signed to have exactly the same results as devaluation and vice 
versa. Devaluation has some advantages over surcharges and export 
bonus programs except where the government wishes to maintain an 
intricate multiple exchange system. In such a case, neither alter-
native has a clear advantage. 
The maintenance of more than one exchange rate leads to a 
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misallocation of resources—except in the presence of externalities. 
While it is to Pakistan's advantage to exploit her monopoly posi-
tion in jute (and possibly cotton) and should keep the effective 
exchange rate for this commodity low, we have argued that in all 
other cases the gaps between the effective exchange rates for im-
ports and exports should be reduced. 
In the end, the advocates of devaluation are advocating the 
elimination of the major portion of discriminatory taxes on imports 
and exports which make up the current exchange system. The advocacy 
of devaluation is a call for simplicity and orthodoxy; a call to 
restore to the exchange rate the role of a price which by reflecting 
the true opportunity cost of foreign exchange leads to its effi-
cient use. 
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